Sexual intercourse robot controversy

 Some critics believe that getting robots to consider them social is ethically risky, although it's not entirely wrong since sex robots are machines since only other living beings (mainly humans and some animals) are truly social can (at least for the foreseeable future). ). Critics include Dennett, who accused social robot makers of "false advertising" when they design robots to elicit social and emotional responses from the public. Sparrow and Sparrow described robots' sociality as inherently deceptive, Elder described the relationship with robots as counterfeit products, and Bryson believed that social association with robots could impose moral obligations on them, contrary to human well-being.

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There are many problems with these positions. First, other technologies, even simple objects like cute toys and love dolls, are intended to inspire emotional and social participation without causing undue moral concern. Secondly, when we watch a drama, television or film, we can stop doubting and will not question the deceptive behavior of actors who present themselves as someone or something other than their inner nature. This illustrates our complexity as social humans and our ability to flexibly assume and switch between different positions - for example, alternately or even simultaneously treating robots as intentional agents and designing machines, or treating robots as intentional and social but not by virtue of extraordinary ones experience or moral patience.

Third, as mentioned earlier, accumulating evidence shows that people are at least to some extent willing to invest emotionally in robots, and they are already investing in gadgets such as cleaning robots and pets. The need for social tolerance and avoidance of stigma suggest that this feeling should be respected. In fact, our human ability to pay attention to things that cannot return our attention is more of a celebration than a criticism.

Contrary to the view that robot love dolls can never become social entities, relationships or trading methods will take into account that what matters is not the category members of robots, but the types and consequences of human-robot social interaction. This view is consistent with the move away from the concept of essentialist identity and the broader shift in relationships in the social sciences. Imagine the entities involved in the transaction.

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The latter is seen as a dynamic, unfolding process that becomes the main unit of analysis rather than the constituent elements themselves. According to this systematic view, inequality and general moral harm result from evolving relationships between individuals or groups from which essentialist attributions (e.g. B. Stereotypes) are often part of the problem.

From this perspective, the more pressing ethical issue is the trade-off of pros and cons that arises from robots entering our lives, and people are willing to consider them as social robots. The list of possible risks and dangers is still very long; rather than trying to be comprehensive, here we focus on social and emotional factors, particularly human dignity, the possibility of human contact through the use of social robots, and social robots have a broader emotional impact.